Cosmology is usually understood as an observational science, where experimentation plays no role. It is interesting, nevertheless, to change this perspective addressing the following question: what should we do to create a universe, in a laboratory? It appears, in fact, that this is, in principle, possible according to at least two different paradigms; both allow to circumvent singularity theorems, i.e. the necessity of singularities in the past of inflating domains which have the required properties to generate a universe similar to (...) ours. The first of them is substantially classical, and is built up considering solitons which collide with surrounding topological defects, generating an inflationary domain of space–time. The second is, instead, partly quantum and considers the possibility of tunnelling of past-non-singular regions of spacetime into an inflating universe, following a well-known instanton proposal. We are, here, going to review some of these models, as well as highlight possible extensions, generalizations and the open issues (as for instance the detectability of child universes and the properties of quantum tunnelling processes) that still affect the description of their dynamics. In doing so we will remark how the works on this subject can represent virtual laboratories to test the role that fundamental principles of physics (particularly, the interplay of quantum and general relativistic realms) played in the formation of our universe. (shrink)

Scale invariance is considered in the context of gravitational theories where the action, in the first order formalism, is of the form S=∫ L 1 Φ d 4 x+∫ L 2 $\sqrt{-g}$ d 4 x where the volume element Φ d 4 x is independent of the metric. For global scale invariance, a “dilaton” φ has to be introduced, with non-trivial potentials V(φ)=f 1 eαφ in L 1 and U(φ)=f 2 e 2αφ in L 2 . This leads to non-trivial (...) mass generation and a potential for φ which is interesting for inflation. Interpolating models for natural transition from inflation to a slowly accelerated universe at late times appear naturally. This is also achieved for “Quintessential models,” which are scale invariant but formulated with the use of volume element Φ d 4 x alone. For closed strings and branes (including the supersymmetric cases), the modified measure formulation is possible and does not require the introduction of a particular scale (the string or brane tension) from the begining but rather these appear as integration constants. (shrink)

In this article, based on a critical metaphor analysis, we identify and describe multimodal metaphors involving the human body and its conceptualizations in five auteur films of the 2010s. Studies on the human body in cinema have documented how it changes according to underlying ideologies. Our research focuses on the role of image schemas and metaphors as they embody meanings and sociocultural paradigms. Metaphors also frame how the body is conceptualized according to dominating ideological practices such as (a) commodification, (b) (...) the integration between artificial and organic, (c) dissatisfaction, (d) dynamics of beautification and idealization, and (e) politicization of the human body. We show how metaphors are creative tools to reframe meanings and representations of the body and how the body is a construct refashioned within the cinematic discourses of these films. (shrink)

This volume has 41 chapters written to honor the 100th birthday of Mario Bunge. It celebrates the work of this influential Argentine/Canadian physicist and philosopher. Contributions show the value of Bunge’s science-informed philosophy and his systematic approach to philosophical problems. The chapters explore the exceptionally wide spectrum of Bunge’s contributions to: metaphysics, methodology and philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of biology, philosophy of technology, moral philosophy, social and political (...) philosophy, medical philosophy, and education. The contributors include scholars from 16 countries. Bunge combines ontological realism with epistemological fallibilism. He believes that science provides the best and most warranted knowledge of the natural and social world, and that such knowledge is the only sound basis for moral decision making and social and political reform. Bunge argues for the unity of knowledge. In his eyes, science and philosophy constitute a fruitful and necessary partnership. Readers will discover the wisdom of this approach and will gain insight into the utility of cross-disciplinary scholarship. This anthology will appeal to researchers, students, and teachers in philosophy of science, social science, and liberal education programmes. 1. Introduction Section I. An Academic Vocation Section II. Philosophy Section III. Physics and Philosophy of Physics Section IV. Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind Section V. Sociology and Social Theory Section VI. Ethics and Political Philosophy Section VII. Biology and Philosophy of Biology Section VIII. Mathematics Section IX. Education Section X. Varia Section XI. Bibliography. (shrink)

Progressive supranuclear palsy is a movement disorder with prominent tau neuropathology. Brain diseases with abnormal tau deposits are called tauopathies, the most common of which is Alzheimer's disease. Environmental causes of tauopathies include repetitive head trauma associated with some sports. To identify common genetic variation contributing to risk for tauopathies, we carried out a genome-wide association study of 1,114 individuals with PSP and 3,247 controls followed by a second stage in which we genotyped 1,051 cases and 3,560 controls for the (...) stage 1 SNPs that yielded P ≤ 10-3. We found significant previously unidentified signals associated with PSP risk at STX6, EIF2AK3 and MOBP. We confirmed two independent variants in MAPT affecting risk for PSP, one of which influences MAPT brain expression. The genes implicated encode proteins for vesicle-membrane fusion at the Golgi-endosomal interface, for the endoplasmic reticulum unfolded protein response and for a myelin structural component. © 2011 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

In “A new proof of the completeness of the Lukasiewicz axioms” Chang proved that any totally ordered MV-algebra A was isomorphic to the segment \}\) of a totally ordered l-group with strong unit A *. This was done by the simple intuitive idea of putting denumerable copies of A on top of each other. Moreover, he also show that any such group G can be recovered from its segment since \^*}\), establishing an equivalence of categories. In “Interpretation of AF C (...) *-algebras in Lukasiewicz sentential calculus” Mundici extended this result to arbitrary MV-algebras and l-groups with strong unit. He takes the representation of A as a sub-direct product of chains A i, and observes that \ where \. Then he let A * be the l-subgroup generated by A inside \. He proves that this idea works, and establish an equivalence of categories in a rather elaborate way by means of his concept of good sequences and its complicated arithmetics. In this note, essentially self-contained except for Chang’s result, we give a simple proof of this equivalence taking advantage directly of the arithmetics of the the product l-group \, avoiding entirely the notion of good sequence. (shrink)

This work aims to make a critical and propositional exposition about the semantics of concepts in general, from the book Transcendental semantics of Kant (2000), by Loparic. In general terms, the exposition of the theme, by this author, focused on the general classification of the semantics of concepts, their meanings and referents. In turn, the critics was directed to several aspects of its exposition, such as: the precision of the nomenclature used, the introduction of new definitions and the correction of (...) others, the reformulation of the classification of the semantics of the concepts. Finally, the proposition highlighted three main points: (i) the conception of the equivalent epistemological status between logic and mathematics, as symbolic sciences with their own form and content; (ii) the weak and strong concept of sciences in general (formal and empirical) as pure and applied sciences, respectively; (iii) the possible metalinguistic conception of the semantics of concepts. (shrink)

In 1997, I introduced the concept and the phrase “bio art”, originally in relation to my artwork “Time Capsule”. This work approached the problem of wet interfaces and human hosting of digital memory through the implantation of a microchip. The work consisted of a microchip implant, seven sepia-toned photographs, a live television broadcast, a webcast, interactive telerobotic webscanning of the implant, a remote database intervention, and additional display elements, including an X-ray of the implant. While “bio art” is applicable to (...) a large gamut of in vivo works that employ biological media, made by myself and others, in 1998, I started to employ the more focused term “transgenic art”. Republished in Ars Electronica ‘99—Life Science, ed. Gerfried Stocker and Christine Schopf, 289–296.) to describe a new art form based on the use of genetic engineering to create unique living beings. Art that manipulates or creates life must be pursued with great care, with acknowledgment of the complex issues it raises and, above all, with a commitment to respect, nurture, and love the life created. I have been creating and exhibiting a series of transgenic artworks since 1999. I have also been creating bio art that is not transgenic. The implications of this ongoing body of work have particular esthetic and social ramifications, crossing several disciplines and providing material for further reflection and dialog. What follows is an overview of theses works, the issues they evoke, and the debates they have elicited. (shrink)

This article tries to delineate the proposition that to Feuerbach nature is an autonomous and independent being that comes first in comparison to the spirit. To him, material nature, that exists in its qualitative differentness, independent from thinking, is the original source, the immediate, not deductible, uncreated fundament of all real existence, that exists and consists in itself, when put vis-a-vis the spirit. Feuerbach sets nature against the spirit, for it is his understanding that nature is not a pure other (...) that only through the spirit was set as nature, but as the first source, the objective material reality that exists outside reason and is given to man by means of his senses as fundament and essence of his life. Therefore, one is dealing first with that essence (light, air, water, fire, plants, animals etc) without which man does not exist or could be thought of as existing. To Feuerbach nature is all objects and essences put together. Under this condition it is possible to conceive nature as guarantor of externality itself as if it could exist independently from us, an entity that is unaware of itself and which exists in itself and by itself; for this reason it shall not be seen as something which it is not, i.e., neither divine nor human. Nature always existed, i.e., it exists in itself and has only meaning in itself; it is itself, i.e., it has no mystical essence, it does not hide behind it any absolute being whether human, divine, transcendental or ideal. (shrink)

From a scientific standpoint, the world is more prepared than ever to respond to infectious disease outbreaks; paradoxically, globalization and air travel, antimicrobial resistance, the threat of bioterrorism, and newly emerging pathogens driven by ecological, socioeconomic, and environmental factors, have increased the risk of global epidemics.1,2,3 Following the 2002–2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), global efforts to build global emergency response capabilities to contain infectious disease outbreaks were put in place.4,5,6 But the recent H1N1, Ebola, and Zika global epidemics have (...) shown unnecessary delays and insufficient coordination in response efforts.7,8,9,10 In a thoughtful and compelling essay,11 Thana C. de Campos argues that greater clarity in the definition of pandemics would probably result in more timely effective emergency responses, and pandemic preparedness. In her view, a central problem is that the definition of pandemics is based solely on disease transmission across several countries, and not on spread and severity together, which conflates two very different situations: emergency and nonemergency disease outbreaks. A greater emphasis on severity, such that pandemics are defined as severe and rapidly spreading infectious disease outbreaks, would make them “true global health emergencies,” allowing for priority resource allocation and effective collective actions in emergency response efforts. Sympathetic to the position taken by de Campos, here I highlight some of the challenges in the definition of severity during an infectious disease outbreak. (shrink)

I argue against Matthew Slater’s rejection of what he calls the grounding claim in his stable property cluster account of natural kinds. This claim states that the epistemic value of natural kinds depends on the existence of some ground to bind together a kind’s properties. Using two test cases from academic medicine, I show that grounds are genuinely explanatory of scientific epistemic practices and that the SPC account should not do without them in its philosophical analysis of natural kinds.

In this paper, I discuss how the principle of identifying knowledge which Strawson advances in ‘Singular Terms and Predication’ (1961), and in ‘Identifying Reference and Truth-Values’ (1964) turns out to constrain communication. The principle states that a speaker’s use of a referring expression should invoke identifying knowledge on the part of the hearer, if the hearer is to understand what the speaker is saying, and also that, in so referring, speakers are attentive to hearers’ epistemic states. In contrasting it with (...) Russell’s Principle (Evans 1982), as well as with the principle of identifying descriptions (Donnellan 1970), I try to show that the principle of identifying knowledge, ultimately a condition for understanding, makes sense only in a situation of conversation. This allows me to conclude that the cooperative feature of communication (Grice 1975) and reference (Clark andWilkes-Gibbs 1986) holds also at the understanding level. Finally, I discuss where Strawson’s views seem to be unsatisfactory, and suggest how they might be improved. (shrink)

In different papers, Carnielli, W. & Rodrigues, A., Carnielli, W. Coniglio, M. & Rodrigues, A. and Rodrigues & Carnielli, present two logics motivated by the idea of capturing contradictions as conflicting evidence. The first logic is called BLE and the second—that is a conservative extension of BLE—is named LETJ. Roughly, BLE and LETJ are two non-classical logics in which the Laws of Explosion and Excluded Middle are not admissible. LETJ is built on top of BLE. Moreover, LETJ is a Logic (...) of Formal Inconsistency. This means that there is an operator that, roughly speaking, identifies a formula as having classical behavior. Both systems are motivated by the idea that there are different conditions for accepting or rejecting a sentence of our natural language. So, there are some special introduction and elimination rules in the theory that are capturing different conditions of use. Rodrigues & Carnielli’s paper has an interesting and challenging idea. According to them, BLE and LETJ are incompatible with dialetheia. It seems to show that these paraconsistent logics cannot be interpreted using truth-conditions that allow true contradictions. In short, BLE and LETJ talk about conflicting evidence avoiding to talk about gluts. I am going to argue against this point of view. Basically, I will firstly offer a new interpretation of BLE and LETJ that is compatible with dialetheia. The background of my position is to reject the one canonical interpretation thesis: the idea according to which a logical system has one standard interpretation. Then, I will secondly show that there is no logical basis to fix that Rodrigues & Carnielli’s interpretation is the canonical way to establish the content of logical notions of BLE and LETJ. Furthermore, the system LETJ captures inside classical logic. Then, I am also going to use this technical result to offer some further doubts about the one canonical interpretation thesis. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that it’s not a good idea to have a theory of truth that is consistent but ω-inconsistent. In order to bring out this point, it is useful to consider a particular case: Yablo’s Paradox. In theories of truth without standard models, the introduction of the truth-predicate to a first order theory does not maintain the standard ontology. Firstly, I exhibit some conceptual problems that follow from so introducing it. Secondly, I show that (...) in second order theories with standard semantics the same procedure yields a theory that doesn’t have models. So, while having an ω- inconsistent theory is a bad thing, having an unsatisfiable theory of truth is actually worse. This casts doubts on whether the predicate in question is, after all, a truthpredicate for that language. Finally, I present some alternatives to prove an inconsistency adding plausible principles to certain theories of truth. (shrink)

In the first part of this essay, I develop the argument that Michel Foucault's work should be read with geographical and topological ideas in mind. I argue that Foucault's archeology and genealogy are fundamentally determined by spatial, topological, geographical, and geometrical metaphors and concepts. This spatial dimension of genealogy is explicitly related to racism and the regimes that domesticate agents through the practices, institutions and ideologies of racialization. The second part offers a genealogical reading of US history and spatiality in (...) terms of its racial institutions. I suggest that if we want to read the US geographies of topographies and cartographies of racism in a Foucauldian manner, then we must focus on plantations, ghettos, and prisons as the spaces‐institutions‐geographies that consolidated the racial matrix of US polity. My goal is to acculturate Foucauldian racial genealogy to the US racial matrix, and, conversely, to read US geo‐history in terms of racializing spatialities. (shrink)

Since the 1980s poetry has effectively moved away from the printed page. From the early days of the minitel to the personal computer as a writing and reading environment, we have witnessed the development of new poetic languages. Video, holography, programming and the Web have further expanded the possibilities and the reach of this new poetry. Now, in a world of clones, chimeras, and transgenic creatures, it is time to consider new directions for poetry in vivo. Below I propose the (...) use of biotechnology and living organisms as a new realm of verbal creation. (shrink)

“Time Capsule” is a work-experience that lies somewhere between a local eventinstallation, a site-specific work in which the site itself is both my body and a remote database, a simulcast on TV and the Web, and interactive webscanning of my body. The live component of the piece was realised on November 11, 1997, in the context of the exhibition “Arte Suporte Computador”, at the cultural centre Casa da Rosas, in Sao Paulo, Brazil. “Time Capsule” was carried live on the evening (...) newscast of the TV station Canal 21 and on tape by two other TV stations (TV Manchete and TV Cultura). The webscast was transmitted by Casa das Rosas.The object that gives the piece its title is a microchip that contains a programmed identification number and that is integrated with a coil and a capacitor, all hermetically sealed in biocompatible glass. The temporal scale of the work is stretched between the ephemeral and the permanent; i.e., between the few minutes necessary for the completion of the basic procedure, the microchip implantation, and the permanent character of the implant. As with other underground time capsules, it is under the skin that this digital time capsule projects itself into the future. (shrink)

This paper is a reply to Benjamin Smart’s : 319–332, 2013) recent objections to David Armstrong’s solution to the problem of induction : 503–511, 1991). To solve the problem of induction, Armstrong contends that laws of nature are the best explanation of our observed regularities, where laws of nature are dyadic relations of necessitation holding between first-order universals. Smart raises three objections against Armstrong’s pattern of inference. First, regularities can explain our observed regularities; that is, universally quantified conditionals are required (...) for explanations. Second, if Humean’s pattern of inference is irrational, then Armstrong’s pattern of inference is also irrational. Third, universal regularities are the best explanation of our observed regularities. I defend Armstrong’s solution of induction, arguing against these three claims. (shrink)

In this essay an engineer and a philosopher, after many conversations, develop an argument for why the Aristotelian version of virtue ethics is the most promising way to develop what we call artificial moral, social agents, i.e. robots. This, evidently, applies to humans as well. There are several claims: first, that humans are not born moral, they are socialized into morality; second, that morality involves affect, emotion, feeling, before it engages reason; third, that how a moral being feels is related (...) to some narrative, whether moral or not; and finally, that narrativity is what builds a sense of a “moral” I, namely an authorial moral self. (shrink)

We respond to criticism of our paper “Paradox in Wave-Particle Duality for Non-Perturbative Measurements”. We disagree with Steuernagel’s derivation of the visibility of the Afshar experiment. To calculate the fringe visibility, Steuernagel utilizes two different experimental situations, i.e. the wire grid in the pattern minima and in the pattern maxima. In our assessment, this procedure cannot lead to the correct result for the complementarity properties of a wave-particle in one particular experimental set-up.

This paper analyzes the theory of area developed by Euclid in the Elements and its modern reinterpretation in Hilbert’s influential monograph Foundations of Geometry. Particular attention is bestowed upon the role that two specific principles play in these theories, namely the famous common notion 5 and the geometrical proposition known as De Zolt’s postulate. On the one hand, we argue that an adequate elucidation of how these two principles are conceptually related in the theories of Euclid and Hilbert is highly (...) relevant for a better understanding of the respective geometrical practices. On the other hand, we claim that these conceptual relations unveil interesting issues between the two main contemporary approaches to the study of area of plane rectilinear figures, i.e., the geometrical approach consisting in the geometrical theory of equivalence and the metrical approach based on the notion of measure of area. Finally, in an appendix logical relations among equivalence, comparison and addition of magnitudes are examined schematically in an abstract setting. (shrink)

I propose a deductive-nomological model for mathematical scientific explanation. In this regard, I modify Hempel’s deductive-nomological model and test it against some of the following recent paradigmatic examples of the mathematical explanation of empirical facts: the seven bridges of Königsberg, the North American synchronized cicadas, and Hénon-Heiles Hamiltonian systems. I argue that mathematical scientific explanations that invoke laws of nature are qualitative explanations, and ordinary scientific explanations that employ mathematics are quantitative explanations. I analyse the repercussions of this deductivenomological model (...) on causal explanations. (shrink)

Each chapter of this dissertation develops a standard with which to evaluate and guide the improvement of a different node of a democratic system. In the first chapter, I consider the relationship between citizens, their environment, and the formal infrastructure of democracy. The standard for this node is democratic health, which is a feature of the social epistemic environment in which citizens operate. I argue that a democratically healthy environment is one that is conducive to the development of citizens’ epistemic (...) capacities to reason and communicate about their interests. I then demonstrate how political phenomena such as polarization pose social epistemic challenges to democratic health and argue that an epistemic conception of civic virtue can guide efforts to improve it. In the second chapter, I consider the relationship between representatives and their constituents under non-ideal conditions. The key standard for this node is systemic interest-responsiveness. I argue that observed public opinion and citizens’ values, commitments, and goals can stand in tension, and that representative democracies must be responsive to both factors. On this basis, I argue in favor of pairing independent administrative agencies with expanded forms of public input. In the third chapter, I consider how civic education can promote epistemic civic virtue. The key standard I develop here is the social epistemic public good. I argue that civic education can provide social epistemic benefits through its civic exchange function, which enables citizens to learn about the views and traditions of other citizens, and prepares them to effectively communicate with diverse others. Furthermore, I argue that this function can be pursued in the absence of widespread agreement about which values civic education should promote. (shrink)

RESUMO Duas versões contemporâneas do contextualismo radical em filosofia da linguagem, uma defendida por François Recanati e outra por Charles Travis, centram sua crítica à distinção tradicional entre semântica e pragmática na categoria de dito, tal como descrita por Paul Grice. Ambas as versões se contrapõem à ideia de que o que é dito é determinado plenamente pelo significado convencional da sentença proferida acrescido da fixação do valor de elementos indexicais. Ambas sustentam, a partir desta crítica, que uma enunciação não (...) necessariamente expressa um conteúdo proposicional associado ao significado literal da sentença. Neste artigo, busco mostrar que a partilha desta tese negativa geral esconde divergências importantes. Centrando minha análise na reformulação feita por Recanati da categoria de what is said, busco mostrar como ela se organiza a partir da preservação e radicalização de princípios essenciais da pragmática griceana, bem como da ideia de que elementos subsentencias possuem um conteúdo proposicional mínimo atrelado à sua significação. Em seguida, busco apontar como a negação total da pragmática griceana e deste mínimo proposicional por Travis não apenas revela uma divergência profunda em relação a Recanati, mas gera problemas para a tentativa de reestruturação da noção de what is said. ABSTRACT François Recanati and Charles Travis have questioned the traditional distinction between semantics and pragmatics by criticizing Grice’s notion of what is said. They are both opposed to the idea that what is said can be read in terms of the conventional meaning of the uttered sentence. Both authors share the thesis according to which what is said does not necessarily put forward a propositional content equivalent to the literal meaning of the uttered sentence. My objective in this paper is to point out important differences between these two positions that are sometimes referred to indistinctively as Radical Contextualism. The paper is centered on the analysis of Recanati’s amendment of the notion of what is said. I first show how his reconstruction of this notion is motivated by the preservation of Grice’s attempt to explain communication in terms of the intention of the speaker. I then proceed to point out how his contextualism admits the idea of a minimal propositional content attached to the meaning of subsentential components. I conclude by arguing that Travis’ rejection of Grice’s whole framework goes against Recanati’s attempt to amend Grice’s notion of what is said. (shrink)

Mathematical proofs aim to establish the truth of mathematical propositions by means of logical rules. Some recent literature in philosophy of mathematics alleges that some mathematical proofs also reveal why the proved mathematical propositions are true. These mathematical proofs are called explanatory mathematical proofs. In this paper, I present and discuss some salient problems around mathematical explanation: the existence problem, the normative problem, the explanandum problems of truth value and psychological value, the logical structure problem, the regress problem and the (...) modelling problem. At the end, I sum up two contemporary models for mathematical explanation – the deductive-nomological model and the model of Steiner. I analyse these models against the previous problems. (shrink)

As proposições condicionais receberam atenção teórica concentrada, embora intermitente, desde a Antiguidade. A atenção durante últimos quarenta anos tem sido intensa. Nesse artigo, apresentaremos os principais desenvolvimentos da análise lógica acerca das proposições condicionais e discutiremos como elas desempenham papel central em muitas teorias filosóficas. Na primeira parte dessas observações introdutórias, mostraremos como os antigos, principalmente as escolas megárica e estoica, envolveram-se com a questão dos condicionais e quão importante isso foi para os posteriores desenvolvimentos da análise lógica dos condicionais (...) no medievo e na Idade Moderna. Por fim, apresentaremos, já na contemporaneidade, C. I. Lewis expondo sua teoria da implicação estrita em franca oposição à doutrina da implicação que ele julgava errada. Espera-se que este trabalho sirva como a apresentação panorâmica de um campo que em lógica ainda é muito frutífero e fecundo para aprofundamentos e novas ideias. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to throw some light on modal realism. Since it is David Lewis who has put forward the best arguments for thar position, I focus on his work. In the first, I point out that his approach does not provide an adequate account for the intuitive lack of symmetry between the actual and the possible. To begin with, I try to show that the strategy of appealing to both the spatio-temporal network and causality is not at (...) all satisfactory. Secondly, I criticize the argument for modal realism that is based on theoretical benefits. Then, I defend the view that Lewis' indexical analysis of the concept of actuality does not satisfy his own criterion of acceptability: an analysis of actuality should account for the intuitions about our actual word. I claim thet Lewis' objections to other positions can be raised against his own position. Finally, I conclude that, even though Lewis is right in claiming that actualist conceptions do not explain why the possible is not part of the actual, the realist conception fail to account for the special ontological status that we intuitively grant to our own world. (shrink)

Vector logic is a mathematical model of the propositional calculus in which the logical variables are represented by vectors and the logical operations by matrices. In this framework, many tautologies of classical logic are intrinsic identities between operators and, consequently, they are valid beyond the bivalued domain. The operators can be expressed as Kronecker polynomials. These polynomials allow us to show that many important tautologies of classical logic are generated from basic operators via the operations called Type I and Type (...) II products. Finally, it is described a matrix version of the Fredkin gate that extends its properties to the many-valued domain, and it is proved that the filtered Fredkin operators are second degree Kronecker polynomials that cannot be generated by Type I or Type II products. (shrink)

This paper defends the Quine-Putnam mathematical indispensability argument against two objections raised by Penelope Maddy. The objections concern scientific practices regarding the development of the atomic theory and the role of applied mathematics in the continuum and infinity. I present two alternative accounts by Stephen Brush and Alan Chalmers on the atomic theory. I argue that these two theories are consistent with Quine’s theory of scientific confirmation. I advance some novel versions of the indispensability argument. I argue that these new (...) versions accommodate Maddy’s history of the atomic theory. Counter-examples are provided regarding the role of the mathematical continuum and mathematical infinity in science. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper defends David Armstrong’s solution to the problem of inductionb against Helen Beebee’s attack on that solution. To solve theproblem of induction, Armstrong contends that the timeless necessity explanation is the best explanation of our observed regularities, whereas Beebee attempts to demonstrate that the time-limited necessity explanation is an equally good explanation. Allegedly, this explanation blocks Armstrong’s solution. I demonstrate that even if the time-limited ecessity explanation were an equally good explanation of our observed regularities, this explanation does (...) not block Armstrong’s solution. I argue that, in fact, the timeless necessity explanation is a better explanation of our observed regularities than is the time-limited necessity explanation. (shrink)

In Republic 4, Plato’s Socrates argues that there are three elements in the soul: the rational, the spirited, and the appetitive. This paper focuses on the argument distinguishing spirit from appetite in the story of Leontius. I shall argue that the rational element first opposes Leontius’ appetite and, when appetite overpowers reason, then Leontius’ spirited part opposes the appetitive. Consequently, there is a kind of disgust that would be appropriately characterized as rational; and, drawing on this consequence, I suggest that (...) the primary target of early ethical education is the rational element of the soul. (shrink)

Este artículo intenta desarrollar una deducción del concepto de sumo bien kantiano: esto es, intenta demostrar, de acuerdo con la interpretación de Dieter Henrich acerca de la deducción, que el sumo bien es un fin a la vez que un deber. Apelo a los rasgos de la razón práctica que constituyen la legitimidad de los hechos, la premisa que cualquier deducción debe tener. De acuerdo con Kant, el sumo bien consiste en la felicidad, la virtud y sus relaciones de proporcionalidad (...) y causalidad, tal que la felicidad es proporcional a, y causada por, la virtud. Sostengo, utilizando las nociones kantianas aceptadas, que Kant tiene razones convincentes para concluir que el sumo bien es, de hecho, un fin a la vez que un deber. Si esto es correcto, entonces este argumento ofrece la deducción prometida en mi título. This paper attempts a deduction of Kant's concept of the highest good: that is, it attempts to prove, in accordance with Dieter Henrich's interpretation of the notion of deduction, that the highest good is an end that is also a duty. It does this by appealing to features of practical reason that make up the legitimating facts that serve as the premises that any deduction must possess. According to Kant, the highest good consists of happiness, virtue, and relations of proportionality and causationbetween happiness and virtue, such that happiness is proportional to and caused by virtue. I argue, by drawing on accepted Kantian notions, that Kant had compelling reasons for concluding that the highest good is in fact an end that is also a duty. If correct, then this argument provides the deduction promised in my title. (shrink)

There are a considerable number of logics that do not seem to share the same inferential principles. Intuitionistic logics do not include the law of the exclude.

Transhumanists, like other elites in modernity, place great value on human creativity, and advances in human enhancement and AI form the basis of their propos- als for boosting it. However, there are problems with this perspective, due to the unique ways in which humans have evolved, procreated and socialized. I first describe how creativity is related to past evolution and developmental aspects in children, stressing pretend play and the ambivalent character of creativity. Then, I outline proposals for enhancing creativity, be (...) it in embodied humans on the way to a superior species, in AI- related beings (virtual reality, robotics), or even in any degree of mixture in human- machine interaction. In the final section, I describe intrinsic limits to these proposals, such as the absence of a good understanding of human psychology by the proponents of enhancement; the lack of interest in the subjective side of creativity (for one’s own sake); delayed maturation and the ambivalence of pretend play in childhood; and the contrariness typical of new human generations. As for the enhancement of creativity, it is argued that creativity in its social context may be the victim of its own past success. On the other hand, an asymmetry between virtual beings and children is described— the latter can behave in a nasty way, it is part of their growth and creativity, whereas the former are not supposed to cause any harm to human beings. In sum, despite impressive progress in several scientific and technological interventions in creativity, philosophical questions emerge that place many constraints on transhumanist dreams of endless creativity. (shrink)

Al final de la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar, Kant aborda el problema de las pruebas de la existencia de Dios y revisa en detalle el argumento que a él le parece el único capaz de provocar verdadero asentimiento: la prueba moral. Se revisa el camino que sigue Kant para llegar, a través de su anál..

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v37-flichman.

El artículo presenta una interpretación del abordaje axiomático temprano a la geometría de David Hilbert, i.e., el desarrollado entre 1891 y 1905. Se sostiene que diversos aspectos de este abordaje, a primera vista problemáticos, se pueden comprender mejor si se contrastan con una de sus influencias más importantes en este periodo: la teoría pictórica [Bildtheorie] de Heinrich Hertz. En particular se argumenta que un análisis de la concepción axiomática de Hilbert a la luz de la teoría de Hertz permite aliviar (...) ciertas tensiones en la concepción hilbertiana; más precisamente, las tensiones que surgen de mantener, al mismo tiempo, una posición axiomática abstracta o formal y una concepción empirista de la geometría, que la considera una ciencia natural. (shrink)

How do scientists and theologians conceive new ways of mapping the world? Can parallels be found between the images they use, or the models they offer when new questions arise? I will explore Albert Einstein’s views on scientific imagination with the goal of contributing – at least within his own perspective – to answering these questions. Drawing on McGrath, I will first briefly describe Einstein’s desire for a unified vision of reality, the links between science and a ‘cosmic religion’, and (...) his overall ideas on transcendence. I will later further develop Einstein’s fundamental features of a cosmovision that grounds his work in physics, and encompasses his philosophical views on human existence and his general way of seeing the world. I will focus on Ideas and Opinions (1982), which will allow me to set the broad picture of his theory of everything and, at the same time, bring up the central aspects of Einstein’s ideas on the scientific imagination. Finally, I will briefly summarise my conclusions concerning Einstein’s views on the nature of scientific imagination as a mental device, especially regarding its twofold role in what I call ‘visual image play’ and conceptualization. (shrink)

Sobre la base que aportan las notas manuscritas de David Hilbert para cursos sobre geometría, el artículo procura contextualizar y analizar una de las contribuciones más importantes y novedosas de su célebre monografía Fundamentos de la geometría, a saber: el cálculo de segmentos lineales. Se argumenta que, además de ser un resultado matemático importante, Hilbert depositó en su aritmética de segmentos un destacado significado epistemológico y metodológico. En particular, se afirma que para Hilbert este resultado representaba un claro ejemplo de (...) uno de los rasgos más fructíferos y atractivos de su nuevo método axiomático formal, o sea, la capacidad de descubrir y exhibir conexiones estructurales o internas entre diferentes teorías matemáticas. On the basis of a set of unpublished notes for lecture courses on geometry, the paper seeks to contextualize and analyze one of the most important and original contributions of David Hilbert's celebrated monograph Foundations of Geometry, namely its arithmetic of line segments. It is argued that Hilbert attributed to his arithmetic of segments an important epistemological and methodological meaning, in addition to its relevance as an original mathematical result. In particular, it is claimed that for Hilbert his arithmetic of segments represented a clear example of one of the most fruitful and attractive traits of his new formal axiomatic method, i.e., the power to discover and exhibit inner or structural connections among different mathematical theories. (shrink)

El artículo presenta y analiza un conjunto de notas manuscritas de clases para cursos sobre geometría, dictados por David Hilbert entre 1891 y 1905. Se argumenta que en estos cursos el autor elabora la concepción de la geometría que subyace a sus investigaciones axiomáticas en Fundamentos de la geometría . Por un lado, afirmo que lo que caracteriza esta concepción de la geometría es: i) una posición axiomática abstracta o formal; ii) una posición empirista respecto del origen de la geometría (...) y de su lugar dentro de las distintas teorías matemáticas. Por otro lado, sostengo que el papel que Hilbert le confiere a la intuición geométrica en el proceso de axiomatización de esta teoría, permite apreciar claramente su oposición respecto de las posiciones formalistas con las que habitualmente es identificado. (shrink)

This paper aims to offer an interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories which puts together two of its most distinctive and fundamental traits: the constant reference to the temporal character of the human consciousness and the use of the analytic method of exposition. We will defend the thesis that the connection between both traits is essential, i. e., it will be argued that it is precisely the usage of the analytic method what confers to the pure consciousness of (...) time a significant role in the structure of the argument. With this thesis an alternative reading of the A-Deduction is pursued, one which moves away from the predominant one which claims that Kant's persistent allusion in it to the pure time representation - and to the synthesis which make it possible - is just a direct consequence of its psychological character.El objetivo del artículo es ofrecer una interpretación de la Deducción Transcendental de las Categorías que ponga en relación dos de sus aspectos más distintivos y fundamentales: la referencia permanente al carácter temporal de la conciencia humana, y la utilización del método analítico de exposición. Se defenderá la tesis de que la conexión entre ambos aspectos es esencial, en tanto que es precisamente la adopción del método analítico lo que determina que se le confiera a la conciencia pura del tiempo un rol fundamental en la estructura del argumento. Con esta tesis se intenta ofrecer una lectura alternativa de la Deducción A, que se diferencie de la habitual según la cual la apelación constante de Kant a la representación pura del tiempo - y a las síntesis que lo hacen posible - es una consecuencia directa del carácter psicologista que la distingue. (shrink)

Five types of constructions are introduced for non-prioritized belief revision, i.e., belief revision in which the input sentence is not always accepted. These constructions include generalizations of entrenchment-based and sphere-based revision. Axiomatic characterizations are provided, and close interconnections are shown to hold between the different constructions.

In this chapter I will bring together two seemingly irreconcilable aspects of Rorty’s intellectual biography: on the one hand its consistency, loyalty, and deference to what I call his “vision,” and on the other, the expansiveness, capaciousness, voraciousness, and encyclopedic thrust of that vision. I argue that in contrast to many canonical philosophers, Rorty did not undergo a turn, a “Kehre,” a shift, a revelation, a Damascus moment. Rather, when reading his epochal texts, and numerous essays, one gets the impression (...) of an Amazonian river widening its shores and drinking its tributaries, relentlessly moving forward following its own course. I thus argue that we think of Rorty, following Berlin’s famous allegory, as a foxy hedgehog, one that pursued one truth, while rummaging inquisitively along the plains and forests of Western culture. From Platonism to metaphilosophy, from metaphilosophy to post-philosophy, and from there to the project of a liberal utopia, which brings together what I called his Brechtian patriotism, with his honest, open, and sincere ethnocentrism, the Rortyan vision has been held steady by one thought: “There are only languages that serve some human purposes better than others. Human purposes and human languages change in tandem with each other” (Rorty 2010, p. 22). Another way of expressing this vision is to say that what makes humans a unique animal is that we can recreate ourselves by means of changing our vocabularies. (shrink)

According to Etchemendy, in attempting to offer an analysis of the modal features of the intuitive concept of logical consequence, Tarski has committed a modal fallacy. In this paper, I consider the thesis according to it is posible to analyze the modals properties of concept of logical consequence through of a generalization on set-theoretical interpretations. As is known, some philosophers have tried to argue for the transit from the general to the modal by showing that there are enough settheoretic interpretations (...) so as to be able to represent the modal features of the intuitive concept of consequence. As is also known, those people have encountered a lot of difficulties. In the present paper, I will try to show that those problems are related not with the specific possibility of accounting for the modal features by means of a set-theoretic notion of model but with the possibility of coming up with a precise mathematical theory for the concept of interpretation, and, as such, they can be solved by way of appealing to the usual solutions to this problem. (shrink)